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 Comparative politics has shown interest in the topic of financing political par-
ties only recently. The reason for this is the fact that a more systematic regulation 
of financing elections and parties – apart from Sweden where the process of 
regulation began in the 1960s – started only in the 1970s and 1980s. Namely, the 
expenditure incurred by party activities in that period increased significantly eve-
rywhere, making the traditional sources of party financing such as membership 
fees, money raised at party rallies and so on, completely inadequate. Since that 
time the practice of supplementing these scarce party funds through a system of 
public subsidies of parties and elections from the budget was introduced.  
 The regulation of party financing has not taken the same form in all countries 
and did not happen at the same time. In the United States, for example, elections 
are financed mostly from private funds. The expenditure for elections and parties 
has, however, become a subject of public scrutiny and special auditing, while the 
financial support limits have been precisely determined. Similar processes have 
been at work in Canada and Australia as well as in some European countries such 
as Holland. On the other hand, in Austria, Italy, Germany and Sweden, a system 
of heavy reliance of parties on the budget subsidies has gradually evolved. 
 Besides the sources of financing, the regulation covers TV promotion of par-
ties and their candidates. In most countries TV coverage for election campaigning 
cannot be simply bought since it is precisely regulated; all political actors must 
enjoy equal access to today’s most ubiquitous medium. The exception to the rule 
are the United States where TV time for election campaigning is up for grabs. 
 And finally, the financing of Croatian political parties is looked into. Unlike 
in the developed Western countries, financing of parties has not yet been sub-
jected to major regulation. Due to this lack of precise regulation, the flow of party 
funds is concealed from the public, regarding both its provenance and its spend-
ing.  
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 I. Methodological problems of political finances 
 Although political parties are among the key institutions of political systems and, 
consequently, a topic of great interest of political scientists, their financing has always 
attracted more attention of the general public than of researchers. The relevant literature 
does include a certain number of works on financing of political parties, but that part of 
the contemporary comparative politics is considered its weakest part. The first to look 
into the financing of political parties was Arnold J. Heidenheimer in the early 1960s. 
Later, he co-authored the watershed book from the field of comparative public policies 
(Heidenheimer/Heclo/Adams, 1990). After him, the most significant contribution to the 
research of the sources of party funds was that of the American political scientist Her-
bert E. Alexander, the author of the first comparative study on party financing (Alexan-
der, 1989). 
 Does the fact that parties do play a major role in political systems necessarily imply 
that they ought to be publicly financed? Or should parties, in raising the funds requisite 
for their activities, rely on private interests? As the German political scientist Karl-
Heinz Nassmacher writes: “In all Western democracies, these two closely linked ques-
tions have become a public policy issue” (Nassmacher, 2000: 233). 
 
 1. “Party money” or political finances 
 The political debate about party financing today boils down to the opposition along 
the lines of private versus public sources of financing. A variety of private sponsorships 
used to be a norm in financing parties practically up to the early 1960s. The first exam-
ple of public financing of parties occurred in Costa Rica in 1954, followed by Argentina 
in 1955. The first European instance of this occurred in Germany in 1959. With time, 
the subsidies from the budget became an inevitable, and in a number of countries the 
most important source of party funds. The fact is that without the state subsidies it is 
more or less impossible to bridge the ever-present gap between the money that citizens 
are willing to give to parties in one form or another, and the money that parties spend in 
pursuing their extensive activities. The upsurge in the public financing of parties is due 
to a series of corruption scandals linked with the efforts of parties to secure the neces-
sary funds as well as to the demand to provide a fair political competition. 
 So, all systems of political financing started with private financing. However, de-
spite this common base, the political developments of the second half of the 20th century 
resulted in completely different systems of financing. For example, the system in Ger-
many is dissimilar to the system in the United Kingdom or the one operational in the 
US. Abandoning the model of exclusive private financing did not mean the end of the 
corruption scandals linked with party financing. On the contrary, in Great Britain, which 
retained the system of private financing of the parties, there have been almost no scan-
dals of this sort, while in Germany, where the parties for the most part are financed from 
the budget, corruption scandals are a very common occurrence (money laundering, 
slush funds). The reason for this is probably the fact that, unlike in Germany, in Great 
Britain there are no tax incentives, i.e. tax deductions for donations to the parties. This 
is probably the main reason underpinning the German corruption scandals. If the recent 
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developments in party financing in Great Britain and Germany are compared, it turns 
out that in the UK the share of party funds coming from the membership fees has been 
dwindling and that the major private financiers of the parties are corporations (particu-
larly for the Conservative party) and trade unions (especially for the Labour party). 
Also, there are no tax deductions for private benefactors; in Germany, more and more 
funds come from membership fees and the state, and private donations are tax-deductible. 
 
 2. Scope of political financing and the comparability of the existing data 
 The research of political financing in contemporary political science in general, and 
particularly in comparative politics, does not occupy the place it should as an obviously 
relevant political phenomenon. There are more reasons for this, but two stand out. The 
first is the obstacles we encounter when comparing the national data on financing par-
ties and elections, and the second is a lack of a proper theory of political finances. 
 Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, the British political scientist and a major researcher of 
political finances, has often reiterated that there are serious shortcomings in our know-
ledge about international money intended for parties, the activities of pressure groups, 
secret funds, the real personal wealth of the leading politicians and so on (Pinto-
Duschinsky, 1981). 
 Thus, the issue of financing parties and elections is almost always linked with 
considerable pitfalls. Based on the experiences of Western countries in this area, the 
only conclusion you can make is that there is no simple solution for these problems. 
Also, you can say that a proper review of party financing should include all aspects of 
raising money for parties and elections, which means that the finances of local branches 
of political parties ought to be covered as well, the financing of local elections, intra-
party elections, financing of party parliamentary clubs and alike. In other words, an au-
dit of party finances should look into the entire party organization, into the institutions 
directly or indirectly linked with parties, and into different forms of secondary financ-
ing, these days quite prominent in party functioning. The data available to the research-
ers mostly refer to the national level of party activities, while the data about the sub-na-
tional or the supra-national levels are often fragmentary and unreliable.  
 
 II. Sources of party financing 
 1. Public financing 
 Public financing of parties from the budget is a relatively recent phenomenon. It was 
introduced only in the 1950s (see Table 1), but despite its novelty it soon became the 
most dominant source of the “party money” in many Western countries. However, fi-
nancing parties from the state coffers is not a contemporary phenomenon. There have 
been examples of secret government funds funneled to their own parties or of bribing 
journalists and members of other parties (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1981: 33). 
 The secret financing of parties was replaced with the public financing only in the 
1950s. The budgetary donations were first given out by Costa Rica and Argentina, fol-
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lowed by Germany and then an array of European and other countries worldwide. As a 
matter of fact, the list of the countries that do not envisage a system of public party 
financing is extremely short: India, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Holland1 and the 
United Kingdom. 
 There are three types of direct state subsidies: the subsidies that cover the cost of 
electoral campaign and the subsidies for the regular party activities; the subsidies for 
political parties and the subsidies for individual candidates; the subsidies for the parties’ 
main offices and the subsidies for the regional and local branches and organizations. 
 
   Table 1: Introduction of public financing of political parties 
Country Year 



















Source: Herbert E. Alexander, Money and politics: rethinking a con-
ceptual framework, in: Alexander, 1989: 14.  
 
 In the first type we distinguish three groups of countries. The first group includes 
France, Italy (after 1993), Canada and Poland, where the public subsidies are given to 
the parties solely on the basis of the campaigning expenditure. Unlike these countries, in 
the second group of countries, comprising Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Greece, 
Italy (from 1974 to 1993), Japan, Hungary, Germany, Portugal and Sweden, the parties 
 
1 In Holland, however, there is a system of public subsidies for educational institutions with ties to 
political parties.  
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get public grants for their everyday operation. And finally, in several countries the par-
ties get public subsidies both for their everyday activities and the election campaign ex-
penditure. Israel and Mexico belong to this group. 
 Just as a distinction is made between the regular costs and the electoral costs, in 
many countries there is a difference between the public grants given to the parties and 
those given to individuals. Law sets different limits for these two categories of “con-
sumers of public money”; naturally, the parties fare much better than the individual 
candidates.  
 The smallest differences among the countries can be found in the third group. As a 
rule, the state subsidies go to the national offices of the parties and not to their local 
branches. In this way, party leaderships fortify their power in relation to the local party 
representatives, creating a sort of dependence. However, there are exceptions to the rule. 
In Sweden, local authorities have been directly allotting grants to local party branches 
since 1977. This rule is effective in Croatia as well, which means that local party 
branches in Croatia enjoy a relatively high degree of financial autonomy and that a basi-
cally democratic principle is at work here, the principle that does not exist in many 
countries. Of course, in federal countries such as Australia, Austria, Canada or the US, 
the public grants are given out by the federal units as well, but this is not always the 
rule.  
 
 2. Private financing 
 Private financing of parties has traditionally been a way of collecting funds for their 
operation. The most important source in the beginning were membership fees and do-
nations of party activists; with time, however, the chief sources of funds have become 
plutocratic financing and financing by political institutions. But for contemporary po-
litical scientists this change in the sources of private financing, though compelling, is 
not the most intriguing development: the top research priority is the exploration of the 
relationship between the private and the public financing: pointing out the advantages 
and disadvantages of private financing as well as the typical regularities of this way of 
financing in the party system structures.  
 Private financing has traditionally been a more popular option for the parties of the 
right than the parties of the left. For the rightist parties, the money obtained from private 
sources has always been a more desirable form of financing than the money acquired 
from the national or local budgets. This was a typical and regular feature of all party 
systems in democratic countries. Political analysts also preferred this type of financing. 
The biggest advantage of private financing is the fact that this form of raising money 
fosters a more active participation of party activists and consequently is conducive to a 
more efficient party organization. Contrary to this, reliance on budgetary funds gives 
rise to the bureaucratization of parties, reduces the electoral participation of party activ-
ists and on the whole encourages the development of the “ossified political structures”. 
 A relevant political analysis, however, has to take into consideration the negative as-
pects of private party financing as well because it can result in marked disparities. In the 
societies with huge economic differences, a few extremely wealthy individuals can 
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completely control the political scene. Besides, a strong reliance on private financing 
can lead to corruption. Business people may give money to political parties and indi-
viduals demanding preferential treatment in legislative initiatives and lucrative con-
tracts. Finally, the problem with private donations is also that the provenance of that 
money in many cases is not solely private. Often, the owners of corporations are hun-
dreds or thousands of shareholders who perhaps do not share the same political attitudes 
of the board of directors nor approve of their decisions to give a party their financial 
support. That is why experts for political finances today claim that private donations are 
a desirable source of party finances on condition that these are smaller amounts and that 
they really come from individuals. Also, they think that such donations should be lim-
ited by law. If these conditions are fulfilled, the private financing of parties is preferred 
to the budgetary financing since it avoids many of its disadvantages.  
 Private financing of parties encompasses several sources: membership fees, pay-
ments by institutional actors (trade unions, corporations), plutocratic financing, profits 
of party businesses, donations from interest groups and so on. Let us have a look at how 
the significance of these sources has changed with time and what their importance is to-
day.  
 Membership fees are the most traditional source of financing political parties. Party 
membership cards give importance to their owners, and they reciprocate by paying the 
required monthly or annual sum. In his book on political parties Maurice Duverger 
warned that this type of financing is characteristic mostly for left-centrist parties: social-
democratic, socialist and communist parties. Unlike them, Duverger claims, centrist and 
right-centrist parties rely to a much smaller degree on membership fees, and much more 
on the contributions of wealthy members of the society. Later studies have shown that 
the share of membership fees in political financing depends on the country rather than 
on the type of the party. The level of the commitment of party members in some coun-
tries is extremely high – a good example are Germany and Austria, so that the share of 
membership fees is high, regardless of whether the parties in question are leftist or 
rightist. In the countries in which party organization is more loose, for example all 
American parties, membership fees are a negligible source of financing. In other words, 
Duverger generalized the situation in France, a country with a big difference between 
the parties of the left, organizationally strongly structured, and the parties of the right 
which are much less so (some are even more a movement than a party). Based on this, 
Duverger has drawn the conclusion about the bigger importance of membership fees in 
the finances of leftist parties. More recent political science research has shown that the 
share of membership fees in party funds is getting smaller, and that “in line with the fi-
nancial statistics of parties that, truth to tell, are not entirely comparable, parties obtain 
less than a quarter of their total income from membership contributions.” (Nassmacher, 
2000: 233). 
 Another important form of private financing is rooted in the plutocratic principle. 
Plutocracy is the rule of the rich and is basically an undemocratic type of the legitima-
tion of political power. Different theoreticians of elites have claimed that it is the own-
ership of huge amounts of money that enables the rich to control and decisively influ-
ence the government despite the “one man one vote” principle. The decisive influence 
of the rich may turn the mapping of collective preferences exclusively in the direction of 
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the rich members of political communities. Due to this, an increasing number of provi-
sions regulating this type of financing have been incorporated into the legislation con-
cerning parties and elections.  
 Let us have a brief look at the trends in the plutocratic type of financing political 
parties. Plutocratic financing peaked at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
century, particularly in the most developed countries such as Great Britain and the 
United States. The main source of party finances were wealthy individuals. After that 
institutional financiers (trade unions, corporations) began financing parties, which 
gradually reduced the importance of the funds from plutocratic sources. The signifi-
cance of the plutocratic money was further reduced when states began financing parties 
in the 1950s and the 1960s. Nevertheless, the diminishing share of plutocratic financing 
has not been a linear trend. In the semi-democratic systems of Asian countries (“Asian 
tigers”), the importance of extremely wealthy individuals in financing political parties is 
still relatively high. Equally, unlike the period between the 1950s and the 1970s, when 
the importance of the role of the public financing increased and that of the plutocratic 
financing decreased, following the “neoliberal revolutions” and the trimming of the 
benefits of the welfare state in many developed Western democracies, a big group of 
nouveau riche emerged who generously rewarded such measures of the parties in power 
with their private money. Thus in Great Britain, for example, one increasingly hears 
about the need to revive the plutocratic form of financing parties and candidates. At the 
same time, more and more money from plutocratic sources is being channeled to the 
left-centrist parties (an excellent example is the British Labour party led by Tony Blair), 
traditionally not on the receiving end of rich people’s donations.  
 In many Western countries, laws regulating parties or elections subject the pluto-
cratic financing to strict regulation, particularly in the United States. All the donations 
exceeding a certain (small) amount must be publicly disclosed so that legally it is not 
possible to give a candidate a donation without a public record of that transaction. How-
ever, there are numerous techniques for circumventing such legal provisions: breaking a 
big donation into several smaller ones which then do not have to be reported, lending 
money to parties in the form of loans, donating money to the politicians’ personal funds 
and not the party budgets.  
 The institutional financing of parties and elections reached its apex and is now less 
frequently a source of party finances. Donations by trade unions or individual corpora-
tions were traditionally associated with the clear-cut interests that those actors linked 
with governmental decisions. As a rule, trade unions financed social-democratic and 
communist parties because these parties would try to push through the legislature some 
laws regulating labour issues, the lowest wage and similar things. Presidents of the 
boards, in their constant quest for more secure profits, as a rule supported conservative 
and liberal parties that tried to lower the taxes, deregulate business and so on. Both 
groups tried to financially help those parties that were going to further their interests. 
Such financing was the consequence of the fact that the dominant political cleavage ran 
along the line of the class division into the entrepreneurs and the middle class on the 
one hand (supporting the conservative and the liberal parties), and the working class on 
the other (supporting the social-democratic, socialist or communist parties). The country 
in which this type of party financing was traditionally dominant had been Great Britain. 
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However, with a gradual transition from the industrial into the post-industrial society, 
the significance of such division became obsolete. At the end of the 20th century, politi-
cal conflicts no longer revolved around such divisions, and this weakened the signifi-
cance of the institutional financing.  
 
 3. Corruption and illegal financing  
 Illegal financing of political parties and elections is a problem besetting all political 
systems. Recently, this issue has become a topic of interest of researchers. One of the 
most significant contributions to the research of this phenomenon is that of the Ameri-
can political scientist Susan Rose-Ackerman in her book Corruption and Government: 
Causes, Consequences and Reform (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).  
 First, the author lays down the universal normative stance regarding the financing of 
political parties. According to this perspective, democratic political systems must find a 
way for financing political parties and political campaigns without encouraging politi-
cians to sell out to donators and providers of money. In her opinion, legislation in the 
developed Western democracies has developed some very precise legal mechanisms 
that regulate the possibilities for financing political parties. Legal forms of donations, as 
well as various forms that are not strictly legal, are controlled by the public and the ju-
diciary.  
 Why such control? The answer lies in the simple fact that the manner in which par-
ties are financed can have a deep impact on democratic institutions. If the interests of 
various groups or individuals differ from the interest of the general public, democratic 
values may be undermined. In that case, the electoral process serves as a means for dis-
ciplining politicians in order to make them promote the interests of their electoral body. 
Namely, voters can punish politicians/parties that seem particularly strongly attached to 
certain interest groups. However, the key requirement for that is that the voters know 
something about their representatives’ behavior and who gives them money. Corruption 
can be the end result even if donations are allowed by law if the manner in which they 
have been obtained has not been disclosed to the public.  
 In her book, Susan Rose-Ackerman lists several evident examples of the 
misappropriation of money for political purposes. In 1977 in North Carolina, a dispir-
ited construction firm that had not derived the expected benefits from its donation in the 
form of contracts for public works, demanded the return of the money it invested into 
the electoral campaign of that state’s governor. Also, research by some Japanese politi-
cal scientists and sociologists has shown that the politicians helping local companies to 
get contracts demand a percentage of the value of the contract as a reward for their ef-
forts. In Spain in the 1990s there was a series of scandals concerning the attempts of 
some politicians to secure funds for their parties from banks and private businesses by 
billing them for fictional consulting services. And finally, the most notorious case of 
embezzling private money for political purposes happened in the last decade in Italy, in 
the so-called “clean hands” campaign. Party leaders installed the quasi party officials in 
the posts in which bribery had become routine. Construction industry was a particularly 
profitable source of income. Specialized “money collectors” organized bribe-taking and 
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contracts for non-existent public works. Although officially these people were not poli-
ticians, de facto they were; as people enjoying special trust of the party leaders, they 
were the middleman between the employers and the government officials in securing 
jobs financed by public money.  
 
 III. Non-monetary subsidies and indirect support 
 1. Access to the media 
 There are numerous studies about the importance of TV coverage for the success of 
a party and its candidates and we are not going to go into this. Nevertheless, it should be 
pointed out that a fair distribution of TV time among all political parties and candidates 
is one of the key aspects of the regulation of political financing all over the world. One 
of the most important examples of the indirect subsidies is free access to the media, 
particularly television. Free TV coverage should thus be considered a sort of indirect 
public subsidy. The exception to the rule are the US in which TV coverage must be 
bought, and there are no time limits. It is thought that this is one of the main reasons for 
a sharp rise in the cost of campaigning in the US.  
 There are several open questions concerning free access to television. The first is a 
possible unwillingness of TV producers to provide ample time for the promotion of 
parties and candidates. According to the opinion of media theoreticians, the fundamen-
tal reason for this is the fact that such programmes do not attract big audience. Since TV 
producers’ top priority is to achieve highest possible rankings, they tend to be loath to 
giving up too much space to election campaigns. Another major problem is a fair distri-
bution of TV slots to various parties. This is a sensitive issue. If the distribution is based 
on the results of last elections, the newly formed parties and those whose popularity has 
soared in the period after them will be deprivileged. If, on the other hand, the TV time is 
distributed to all parties equally, minor and radical political options get the public expo-
sure entirely disproportionate to their real political clout. Despite these problems, the 
fair distribution of TV time and the TV coverage of electoral campaigns in the elec-
tronic media represent a major contribution to the democratization of political process. 
 
 2. Indirect financing  
 A review of financing political parties and elections is not complete without an 
assessment of the role of indirect financing, both private and public. There are several 
forms of indirect financing. Regarding the “public money”, i.e. the sphere of public fi-
nances, parties may exercise two sorts of privileges: tax deductions and tax loans. The 
example of the first is the German solution: if you donate an amount of up to 3,000 Eu-
ros to a political party, that amount will be deduced from your total income and thus 
your tax base is lowered. The second form of indirect financing are tax loans. They exist 
in Germany (for the donations of 1,500 Euros per person), but also in some other states. 
In Canada, for example, there is the following system: 75% loan for the first hundred 
donated dollars, then a 50% loan for the donations between a hundred and 550 dollars, 
and the 33% loans for the donations between 550 and 1,150 dollars. This simply means 
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that a person who donates a hundred dollars to a political party pays only 25 dollars, 
while the rest is supplemented from the national budget. The direct consequence of such 
a form of financing is the reliance of political financing on many small contributions, 
thus reducing the role of major donators. In other words, financial sources of party fi-
nances are dispersed, which makes corruption less of a possibility and is more condu-
cive to making financing more in line with the essence of democratic decision-making, 
contained in the motto: one person, one vote.  
 Another form of direct financing are the so-called “party taxes”. Today’s political 
scientists consider this practice one of the perks that party leaders provide to their sup-
porters after they get hold of power. Most often this takes the form of finding employ-
ment for their supporters in civil services and of the preferential treatment of the donator 
companies when contracting out. Since they have authority power in the process of the 
distribution of public resources, party officials are expected to turn over a portion of 
their salaries to their party’s coffers. In US, for example, people who get a job in public 
services despite their inadequate qualifications are obliged to turn over a portion of their 
salaries to their respective party machinery.  
 And finally, another major form of indirect financing are political foundations. 
Though formally independent, they have ties to political parties. The most developed 
system of political foundations can be found in Germany, while in the rest of the conti-
nent the foundations are also politically influential. They cannot participate in the elec-
tions directly, but they do so indirectly by organizing political education of party mem-
bers and activists, pre-election polls and analyses and by helping sister parties abroad.  
 
 IV. Public control of party finances and their regulation 
 The regulation of party financing has with time become the most interesting issue of 
the entire field covered by the terms political finances or party money. In western de-
mocracies, regulation of that area by laws and by-laws has become extremely detailed 
and sophisticated. The general principles concerning the financial sources from which 
parties and/or independent candidates can be financed in elections have been replaced 
with very precise provisions about the manner in which party funds may be used, re-
gardless of whether they come from the private or the public sphere. The regulation of 
party finances covers a plethora of issues concerning the manner of collecting and dis-
tributing “political money”. We are going to focus on the following: setting the limits to 
party expenditure and earnings; provisions concerning the public disclosure of party fi-
nances; bans on certain types of income and certain types of spending.  
 
 1. Limits to earnings and spending  
 Limits to spending refer primarily to the electoral activities of parties. As a rule, fi-
nancing of everyday party activities is not subject to any limitations. The issue, how-
ever, is whether it is possible to properly distinguish between the regular and the elec-
toral party activities. The second important question is that of the non-monetary aid that 
parties very often get in their electoral campaigns. So, is an effective control of party 
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spending possible in the situation when parties pay for an array of services not with 
money but in kind (publicity materials, printing expenses, free transport, etc.). Regard-
less of the disagreement over which items should be included in the real expenditure, in 
many countries the limits to campaign spending are set by law. 
 In Great Britain there are limits for individual candidates who run for the national 
parliament. These limits, however, do not apply to the national party head office. In the 
US, on the other hand, there are limits to the electoral campaign spending of the candi-
dates who have been given public grants. In Canada there are precise limits to the pro-
spective campaign spending for all political parties, not solely for individual candidates.  
 This setting of the limits to financial spending must be accompanied with a series of 
administrative rules that control these limits. First, it is necessary to devise a controlling 
mechanism by means of which expenses are to be approved prior to actual spending, i.e 
a public representative who will be responsible for this. In order for the sanctioning of 
exceeding the established limits to be effective, there are penalties or mechanisms for 
the implementation of the rules. In Great Britain, the candidates for the national parlia-
ment who exceed the permitted financial limits have to quit, i.e. drop their candidacy for 
MPs. Their political opponents have the right to bring legal action to regular courts to 
impose sanctions for breaking the limit. In Australia, Canada and US, you cannot bring 
such charges to regular courts but to a special electoral administration. In US this is the 
responsibility of the Federal Electoral Commission, a financially independent institu-
tion, organizationally structured in such a way that it can autonomously monitor the ob-
servation of financial limits.  
 The purpose of setting the earning limits is reducing the risk of the prospect of par-
ties or candidates becoming too dependent on big donators. The limits are enforced in a 
number of ways, sometimes for parties, sometimes for candidates. In Italy, for example, 
there are no limits regarding the political parties, but there are some for individual can-
didates.  
 The way in which the limits are determined varies. They can be expressed in the 
form of a certain amount of money, a percentage of the donator’s income or assets, or 
based on a certain point of reference, for example average salary. Among the countries 
in which the limits depend on income are: Brazil, France, India, Italy, Israel, Japan, 
Mexico, Russia, US, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey. It should be noted that the limits in most 
countries apply only to certain groups of donators. In Israel the limits are applied to in-
dividuals, in India to companies, in Mexico to non-profit organizations. On the other 
hand, in many countries such limits do not exist at all: Australia, Czech Republic, 
Greece, Canada, Holland, Germany, Sweden and Great Britain. 
 The actual figures of the limits are very interesting. In US, individuals can give to a 
candidate running in federal elections up to a thousand dollars, 5,000 dollars a year to a 
party’s Committee for political activities, and 25,000 dollars a year to a party’s national 
committee. In Italy the limit of financial support from any source is 20 million liras, in 
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 2. Public accounting for party financing 
 The essence of the liability regarding party financing is the attempt to enhance ac-
countability in the use of political money and to avoid corruption. The manner in which 
parties account for their finances greatly differs from country to country. It is possible to 
pick out a few elements, though, which are selectively applied in different countries. 
 First, we can separate the obligation of disclosing the expenditure from the obliga-
tion of disclosing the earnings. As already mentioned, in Great Britain candidates for 
the parliament are obliged to account for their spending, but not to reveal the sources of 
their earnings. There are big differences in the scope of public disclosure of political fi-
nances. In most countries only the total amounts and the main items of earnings and 
spending must be reported. In some countries, however, full reports on all earnings and 
spending are the norm. A further distinguishing element is the difference in the treat-
ment of political parties and individual candidates. In Great Britain, for example, only 
the finances of candidates must be reported, and in Germany the finances of the parties. 
Similarly, some countries make a difference between the funds used for campaigning 
and the funds used for the everyday functioning of parties. For example, in Germany the 
data about all party earnings and spending are regularly reported, and campaigning ex-
penditure is not separately listed. The same applies to Sweden. 
 Two particularly sensitive issues are: who is obliged to publicize their financial re-
ports and who should such reports be addressed to. In that respect, one should distin-
guish between the system based on the donators’ obligation to make public their dona-
tions and the system that obliges the receiver of the donations – a political party or a 
candidate – to do so. In Great Britain donators are obliged to report about their dona-
tions, while in most countries of continental Europe this responsibility lies with those 
who get the donations. And finally, the manner of presentation of political financing is 
not clear, either. It is commonly believed that the public disclosure of party financing 
involves informing the public via the media. However, in some countries, the obligation 
of disclosure does not imply the public, but only special auditing agencies that supervise 
political finances. 
 Thus the manner of public accounting for party or individual candidates’ finances 
depends on the system of regulating and financing parties and elections. The only un-
disputed thing is that the obligation of public disclosure of political financing is gener-
ally considered to be the key element of their reform. One of the leading researchers of 
political finances, the American political scientist Herbert Alexander says: “The argu-
ment is that an effective system of public reporting is to bring about financial responsi-
bility, increase the public trust in the electoral process, and curb excesses and abuses by 
increasing the political risks for anybody who is involved in unfair or illegal campaign 
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 V. Regulation of party financing in Croatia  
 1. Legal framework 
 The operation of political parties in Croatia is regulated by the “Law on political 
parties”, adopted in 1993. The provisions about party financing can be found in Part III 
(Articles 18-22). Article 18 briefly list the possible sources of party financing: member-
ship fees, donations, earnings from publishing and the sale of publicity materials, the 
organization of party rallies, state and local government subsidies, profits from party-
owned companies. The following article claims that the parties whose candidates were 
elected for the Sabor receive on the one hand a fixed allotment for their work and on the 
other a variable part which depends on the number of their party members in the Sabor. 
The funds for the political parties are allotted by the Sabor Committee for the selection, 
appointments, and administrative affairs. 
 The public accounting for party funds is regulated by the other Articles. Article 20 
stipulates that the parties are obliged to publicly disclose the provenance and the in-
tended use of the funds obtained during one year. If they do not keep business records 
of their earnings or obtain them illegally, the parties forswear the right to state subsi-
dies. The next Article stipulates that parties should keep business books in accordance 
with the regulations valid for non-profit juridical persons. And finally, the last Article of 
part III of this Law stipulates that all state-sponsored political parties are obliged to 
submit to the Sabor every year their annual statement of accounts for the previous year. 
This statement should be reviewed by the State auditing office. 
 In comparison with the regulation practiced in some other, especially Western coun-
tries, the regulation of party financing in Croatia is rather rudimentary. The provenance 
of the party money, the manner of its spending and the control of that spending are not 
by any means clearly defined. Parties are left to their own devices. Croatia is in the 
stage that democratic countries went through in the 1960s and the 1970s, when public 
financing and public control of political finances were being introduced. But the Croa-
tian system has some progressive elements such as the provision that regional and local 
bodies may finance political parties. Such a provision, a rarity in other countries, also 
exists in Sweden. It diminishes the dependence of local leaderships of political parties 
on national party leaderships, which is conducive to the democratization of political life. 
Regardless of all this, Croatia has yet to implement a more comprehensive regulation of 
party financing that should in mid-term result in the introduction of the system that is at 
work in the developed European countries.  
 
 2. Sources of financing political parties in Croatia 
 Croatian political parties do not account for their earnings and spending on a regular 
basis. Sometimes, mostly concerning the parliamentary or presidential elections, they do 
submit rough reports about the cost of the election campaign, but they are never accom-
panied by the full information about party finances. This is illustrated by the fact that 
until 2001 political parties did not use to submit reports about their earnings and 
spending and their assets, not even to the Sabor Committee for Constitution, Statutes 
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and political system, although they were obliged to do so by the existing Law on politi-
cal parties. The reports included the statement of party finances for the previous year 
(1999). That year was much more interesting as the costs of financing the campaign for 
the parliamentary elections were included in the 1999 report (the date of the 
parliamentary elections having been 3 January 2002).  
 The parties submitted two kinds of reports: the income and loss statement, and the 
balance sheet. The balance sheets are not of a particular interest to us since it deals with 
the assets and the liabilities of political parties. We are predominantly interested in the 
income and loss statement, particularly its income section. Included in our review are 
two most significant opposition parties: Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ) 
(Croatian Democratic Union) and Hrvatska stranka prava (HSP) (Croatian Party of 
Rights), and three out of five parties of the ruling coalition: Hrvatska seljačka stranka 
(HSS) (Croatian Peasants’ Party), Liberalna stranka (LS) (Liberal Party) and Socijalde-
mokratska partija Hrvatske (SDP) (Social-democratic Party of Croatia). Two parties of 
the ruling coalition: Hrvatska narodna stranka (HNS) (Croatian People’s Party) and 
Hrvatska socijalno-liberalna stranka (HSLS) (Croatian Social-liberal Party) have never 
submitted their financial reports for that year.  
 The data from Table 2 show that the earnings of the political parties in Croatia are 
largely government subsidies as is the case in most countries of continental Europe. The 
only exception to the rule used to be SDP, since very high 55 percent came from the 
party’s personal earnings, most probably property-related income and corporate dona-
tions. In their 2000 statement, however, government subsidies prevailed in the income 
of this party as well and amounted to 59% of the total party budget. 
 
Table 2: Structure of income of political parties in Croatia in 1999 (in thousands kunas) 
Parties Type of income HDZ HSP HSS LS SDP 
1. Subsidies  21,213 1,628 3,900 1,198  5,753 
2. Membership fees and remuneration - -  172  336  373 
3. Income from providing services   - -  96 - - 
4. Other   2,770  63  617  73  7,329 
Total earnings 25,387 1,691 4,785 1,607 13,455 
Source: Sabor Committee for Constitution, Statutes and political system  
Note: The sum total of the itemized earnings does not add up to the sum total of the earnings of 
the HDZ’s party budget.  
 
 The second major feature of the system of party financing in Croatia is the negligi-
ble role of membership fees. Although these fees represent a significant source of in-
come for many parties of continental Europe, this is not the case in Croatia. A rather cu-
rious paradox is at work in Croatia. The party with the largest membership (HDZ) does 
not include membership fees in its report of earnings, while the relatively small Liberal-
na stranka (LS) has the biggest share of membership fees in the total earnings (12 %).  
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 The third feature of the party financing in Croatia is the general intransparency of 
private financing. The income from those sources is included under the category of 
other earnings since neither the Law on political parties, nor the provisions on the book-
keeping of non-profit organizations envisage a more precise obligation for disclosing 
the source of the funds. Thus a major, and for some parties even the most important as-
pect of the source of their income remains unknown.  
 And finally, an attempt should be at least made to bring the overall presentation of 
party financing in line with the European standards, which will probably call for more 
pertinent statements of financial operations. Managing political finances in the democ-
ratic world today is a highly sophisticated enterprise; the Croatian political parties are 
still a distance away from undertaking it.  
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